Schools of economic and commerce: Incentive to work vs disincentive to invest: the case of chaina's rural reform 1979-1984

dc.contributor.authorChoe, Chongwoo
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-22T07:07:11Z
dc.date.available2022-07-22T07:07:11Z
dc.date.issued1995-02
dc.description.abstractAn institutional change from the communal system to the household responsibility system in rural chaina has brought a bout dramatic increase in productivity during the period of 1978-1985,but has also opend up a set of new problems decreased investment among others. I argue in this paper that the new responsibility system is effective to peasants by rendering residual claims but not so in internalizing positive externalities of investment resulting in the underinvestment . Agricultural subsidy investment tax credit the roles of such institutions as township and village enterprises in undertaking the investment in agricultural infrastructure and most fundamentally well-established property rights are discussed as possible remedies.en_US
dc.identifier.isbn1864460199
dc.identifier.issn13232037
dc.identifier.urihttp://econspace.ips.lk/handle/789/704
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesA;95.16
dc.subjectChain's rural reform, underinvestment, Jel classificationsen_US
dc.titleSchools of economic and commerce: Incentive to work vs disincentive to invest: the case of chaina's rural reform 1979-1984en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
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